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Abstract 
This study, in order to provide evidence about the effectiveness of corporate governance tools (content 
management stock ownership, institutional ownership and the percentage of non-duty members of the Board of 
Directors) on earnings management in banks was listed on Tehran Stock Exchange during 2009-2013.The 
sample consisted of 10 banks (all banks listed) were selected as sample data obtained through library research 
and application of new outcomes were collected. 
In this study, three variables of management stock ownership, institutional ownership and the percentage of non-
duty members of the Board of Directors as independent variables used tools of corporate governance. Also, to 
measure earnings management the modified Jones model and to test hypotheses of multivariate regression was 
used and significance was determined using t and F statistics. Finally, it was determined that between three 
characteristics of corporate governance (institutional ownership percentage of share ownership required for 
managers and other members of the board) and there was no profit management. 
Keywords: Earnings management, institutional ownership percentage of share ownership management, the 
percentage of non-duty members of the Board of Directors 
 
1. Introduction 
The primary objective of financial statements is to provide users with information relating to the uncertainty and 
timing of future cash flows. Relevance of accounting numbers creates powerful incentives for managers to 
manipulate earnings to their advantages (Abdul Rahman & Ali, 2006). Healy and Wahlen (1999) stated two 
competing reasons for managers to manipulate their income. The first is the capital market pressure which states 
that the widespread use of accounting information by investors and financial analysts for stock valuation creates 
incentives for executives to manage earnings in order to influence short-term stock performance. The second 
reason is contracting motivation which stresses the use of accounting data to monitor and regulate contracts 
between firms and their stakeholders. Managers can manipulate earnings in order to maximize their income or to 
signal their private information, thus influencing the formativeness of earnings (Gul et al., 2003). Schipper 
(1989) and Healy and Wahlen (1999) declared that earnings management is the alternation of performance by 
insiders to either mislead some stakeholders or to influence contractual outcomes. In other words, managers can 
work opportunistically for their advantage and disadvantage for their companies.  
Dechow et al. (1996) highlighted that accounting earnings are more reliable and more informative 
when managers’ opportunistic behavior is controlled through a variety of monitoring systems. The bankrupt of 
large companies has raised serious questions about the effectiveness of different monitoring devices such as 
external examiner, voluntary disclosure and corporate governance mechanism (Ebrahim, 2007). There has been 
debate in the literature about the effectiveness of corporate governance factors. Corporate governance implies an 
explicit responsibility for boards in the financial reporting process. In doing so, it raises the expectation that 
boards will constrain opportunistic earnings management activities (Epps & Ismail, 2008). Fama and Jensen 
(1983) stated that board of directors has important role in protecting shareholder interests by monitoring firm’s 
management team. Based on agency theory framework, outside directors have an incentive to avoid colluding 
with managers because the value of independent directors’ 
Human capital is partially determined by the effectiveness of their monitoring performance (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Otherwise, the value of their human capital as outside directors may diminish. Therefore, outside 
directors are widely believed to protect the interests of shareholders more effectively.  
Also, the internal mechanisms of corporate governance in a company, including a variety of 
organizational arrangements and procedures used by companies to the balance of power and responsibilities 
between shareholders, board members, executives and employees of the company (Beasley et al., 2000, Flo et 
al., 2001). The ownership structure, board structure, the board, the board members are outside directors, 
managing director and chairman of the board of the same characteristics of the audit committee and the 
determinants and impact the ongoing corporate governance mechanisms (Karselo and Neil, 2000; Cohen et al., 
2002; Liu and Sun, 2005). Many studies in the field of corporate governance mechanisms in corporate focus on 
this   that weakness in the mechanisms of corporate governance in a company with low quality reporting of 
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financial statements, profit and earnings manipulation and fraud, as well as the low level of transparency of 
information and poor communication. (Beasley et al., 2000, Karselo and Neil, 2000, Flo et al., 2001). 
Uncertainty and lack of transparency in financial information released by the company are Because of weakness 
in the company's corporate governance mechanisms established , allow the controlling shareholders that their 
own interests at the expense of other shareholders in the company have maintained their own wealth. There are 
important mechanisms that influence it and achieve the desired quality of earnings; most communities are 
struggling to provide these mechanisms have done. One of these mechanisms, there is a good system of 
corporate governance in companies and enterprises that most countries have put efforts to strengthen and 
improve it. Most previous studies carried out in Iran in the field of earnings management in general, corporate 
governance and its impact on all companies listed on the stock exchange by ignoring investment companies, 
financial intermediaries and banks due to the specific nature of it. 
 
2.Literature Review 
2.1 Earnings management 
This is generally believed by the regulators and the public that managers manipulate reported earnings (Levitt 
(1998); Loomis (1999)). A large body of academic research has examined the existence of earnings 
management, in particular, around specific corporate events in which agency problem is most likely to occur. 
Perry and Williams (1994) provides evidence of managers’ manipulation of earnings in the predicted direction in 
the year preceding the public announcement of management's buyout intention. Erickson and Wang (1999) find 
that acquiring firms manipulate accounting earnings upward prior to stock for stock corporate mergers. Teoh et 
al (1998a and 1998b) find that managers raise reported earnings before initial public offerings and seasoned 
equity offerings. 
Managers have various incentives to manipulate earnings. Some incentives are provided by contractual 
arrangements based on accounting earnings such as bonus plan, debt and dividend covenants, etc. For example, 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) find that sample firms accelerate earnings prior to lending covenants, and 
Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan (1995) find that managers manipulate earnings downwards when their bonus are 
at their maximum. In some cases, earnings management is motivated by regulatory reasons. Previous studies find 
that managers would manipulate earnings to circumvent industry regulations and reduce the risk of investigation 
by anti-trust regulators (Collins et al (1995); Cahan (1992)). However, recent research has been focus more on 
incentives provided by the capital market. Dechow and Skinner (2000) suggest that accounting information such 
as earnings is important for capital market to value the firm, and the increased stock market valuations and stock-
based compensation during 1990’s make managers have more incentives to manage earnings. The results of 
empirical researches are generally supportive to this assertion. Some recent studies show that firms “overstate” 
earnings prior to seasoned equity offering (SEO), initial public offering (IPO) and stock for stock mergers (Teoh 
et al (1998a, b); Erickson and Wang (1999)) in order to get favorable valuation by capital markets. Moreover 
Perry and Williams (1994) find evidence of earnings understatement problem prior to a management buyout. 
Earnings management is different from accounting frauds which violate Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles, because the opportunities of earnings management are inherent in the current financial 
reporting system. Xie et al (2003) argue that the nature of accrual accounting gives managers considerable 
discretion in determining the earnings in any given period. According to Teoh et al (1998a), within the boundary 
of GAAP, managers have several sources to manipulate earnings. They can choose an accounting method to 
advance or delay the recognition of revenues and expenses, use discretionary aspects of the application of the 
chosen accounting method, or adjust the timing of asset acquisitions and dispositions to alter reported earnings. 
Although Schipper (1989) suggests that earnings management could possibly be beneficial by 
providing a means for management to convey their private information on firm performance, there is a potential 
danger of  wealth loss for shareholders when the interests of mangers and shareholders conflict. Since the 
managers are compensated explicitly (salary, bonus, stock option, etc) and implicitly (job security, reputation, 
etc) on the firm’s earnings. Managers may conceal the true performance by earnings management to get a higher 
compensation or keep their jobs at the cost of shareholder’s interest. Moreover, the earnings management 
increases the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, thus investors may make wrong 
decisions based on misleading earnings information. For example, Teoh et al (1998) find that IPO issuers who 
manage earnings aggressively perform relatively bad after IPO compared to those manage earnings 
conservatively and demonstrate the wealth of outside shareholders can be harmed by earnings management. 
A number of prior studies examine the existence of earnings management by identifying a situation 
where earnings management is likely to occur and estimating discretionary accruals. However, some recent 
papers test earnings management by examining the distribution of reported earnings (Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997); Degeorge et al (1999); Brown (2001)). These studies find that the frequency of firms with small positive 
earnings (positive earnings changes or earnings surprise) is higher than expected, while the frequency of firms 
with small negative earnings (negative earnings changes or earnings surprises) is less than expected. These 
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results are explained as the evidence of income-increasing earnings management and support the hypothesis that 
managers have incentives to avoid reporting loss, earnings declines, and earnings missing analysts’ forecasts. 
The reason why meeting such simple benchmarks is so important to managers is probably due to the capital 
market reaction. According to Barth et al (1999) and Skinner and Sloan (2000), failure to meet these earnings 
benchmarks will cause a dramatic drop of stock price. Since the personal wealth of top managers is tied more 
closely to their firms’ stock price in form of stock-based compensation plan in recent years, it is reasonable to 
argue that managers have strong incentives to manipulate earnings to avoid missing earnings benchmarks.  Thus, 
in this thesis, I identify the firms which are in danger of missing some earnings benchmarks and test whether the 
board of directors and audit committee could constrain earnings management behavior when managers have 
strong incentives to do so. However, managers may also adjust earnings downward in some situations. Degeorge 
et al (1999) argue that earnings far beyond the thresholds will be reined in to make future earning thresholds 
more attainable. Therefore I will also examine the ability of board and audit committee in reducing income-
decreasing earnings management.  
 
2-2.Corporate governance mechanism 
• Percent of Independent outside Directors on the Board 
 There is a    considerable literature regarding the effect of the composition of the board of directors (i.e., inside 
versus outside directors). Agency theory supports the idea that board independence should be denominated by 
outside director. Dunn (1987) highlighted that board dominated by outsiders is in a better position to monitor and 
control managers. Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that the role of the board of directors is to protect shareholder 
interests by monitoring managers. An important factor that may affect the board’s ability to monitor the firm’s 
managers is its composition and the percentage of independent directors on the board. 
A number of studies have linked the proportion of outside directors to financial performance and 
shareholder wealth (e.i., Brickley et al., 1994). Moreover, the dominance of non-executive directors is more 
effective in monitoring management. Klein (2002), Xie et al. (2003), Sonda et al. (2003) and Peasnell et al. 
(2005) provided evidence concerning board independence and earnings manipulation and found that companies 
with independent boards are less likely to report abnormal accruals. Conversely, Park and Shin (2003), Abdul 
Rahman and Ali (2006) and Osama and Noguer (2007) found no relationship between outsider directors and 
earnings management. On the other hand, other studies proposing that completely independent boards may not 
be effective in monitoring management. For example, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) found a negative 
relationship between independent board and firm performance, leading them to conclude that boards that have 
too many outsiders lose the expertise associated with officers serving on the board. 
• Board Size 
Board size is viewed as an important element of board characteristics that may affect earnings management 
(Abdul Rahman and Ali, 2006). The  Jordanian code of corporate governance documents that the number of 
board members has been left to the internal system of the company, although in all cases it should not be less 
than 5 members and not more than 13 members. Previous studies failed to provide empirical evidence between 
board size and the effectiveness of monitoring managers. For example, studies of Yermack (1996), Huther 
(1997) and Andres et al. (2005) indicated that larger board size might be less effective in monitoring 
management activities. Nevertheless, Dalton et al. (1999) showed that larger board members provide more 
advantages for their companies through sharing alternative experience which might decrease the incidence of 
earnings management. Previous studies have used board size as a determinant of earnings management, but the 
influence of board size has received mixed results in previous studies. For example, Abdul Rahman and Ali 
(2006) found a positive relation between earnings management and board size. However, Xie et al. (2003) and 
Peasnell et al. (2005) found a negative association between earnings management and board size. Interestingly, 
Abbott et al. (2000) found no relation between quality of earnings and board size. 
• Role Duality 
Consistent with agency theory, the Jordanian corporate governance codes recommend that the role of the 
chairman should be separated from that of the CEO to ensure that the later would not be in a position with too 
much power to handle daily business operations. That is, CEO with excessive power over board could easily 
manipulate income. The dual office structure also permits the CEO to effectively control information available to 
other board members and thus impede effective monitoring (Jensen, 1993).However, stewardship theory argues 
that role duality improve firm performance, because  management’s compensation is tied to the firm 
performance. Previous studies examined the relation between earnings management and role duality. For 
example, Klein (2002) found that discretionary accrual is positively related to the CEO duality. In contrast, 
Beasley (1996) documented no significant relation between the likelihood of financial statements fraud and CEO 
duality. In the same manner, Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) found that separation between the role of CEO and 
chairman has no effect on earnings management. 
• Concentrated Ownership 
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Agency theory suggests that shareholdings held by managers help align their interests with those of shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Furthermore, under the convergence-of-interest hypothesis, insider ownership can 
be seen as a mechanism to constrain the opportunistic behavior of managers and, therefore, earnings 
management is predicted to be negatively associated with insider ownership (Warfield et al., 1995). Unlike the 
UK and the US which have dispersed ownership, ownership in Jordanian public listed companies are much more 
concentrated or owned by family or identifiable group (Al-Fayoumi et al., 2010). Previous studies on earnings 
management found a negative association between earnings management and insider ownership (Warfield et al., 
1995; Chtourou et al., 2001; Abdul Rahman and Ali, 2006). In contrast, Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) indicated that 
insiders' ownership is significantly and positively affect earnings management. 
 
3. Research hypotheses 
Given that the purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and 
management characteristics of interest in the bank is listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange, the research 
hypotheses are as follows: 
• First hypothesis: the percentage of share ownership interest in the bank's executive management listed 
on Tehran Stock Exchange there is a significant relationship. 
•  The second hypothesis: the ownership interest in an entity with the management of the banks listed in 
the Tehran Stock Exchange, there is a significant relationship. 
• The third hypothesis: the percentage of non-duty members of the management board gains in banks 
listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange, there is a significant relationship. 
 
4 -variables and how to measure them 
Variable earnings management (accrual accounting unusual) as the dependent variable is. In this study, an 
adjusted version of Jones's model was developed by Dechow and others, which are used to estimate abnormal 
accruals accounting is calculated as follows: 
 
Where in: 
CACC it: total current accruals (working capital) for the firm i in year t; 
∆CA it: Change in current assets for firm I in year t; 
∆CASH it: change in cash for the firm I in year t; 
∆CL it: Change in current liabilities for the firm I in year t; 
∆CLD it: Change in current portion of long-term debt for the firm I in year t; 
CACCit /TAit-1 = β0i + β1i [(∆REVit -∆RECit) /TAit-1] + β2i [(∆COGSit + ∆INVit) / TAit-1]+ 
 β3i (∆OCFit / TAit-1) + εit 
)2( 
CACCit: the accrual accounting for the firm I in year t, according to the model number (1); 
∆REVit: changes in revenues for the firm i in year t to year t-1; 
∆RECit: Change in accounts receivable for the firm I in year t to year t-1; 
∆COGSit: changes in the cost of goods sold for the firm I in year t to year t-1; 
∆INVit: change in inventories of goods in year t minus the change in inventories of goods in year t-1; 
∆OCFit: change in operating cash flow for the firm I in year t to year t-1; 
TAit-1: Total assets of firm I in year t; 
eit: the error for firm I in year t (an indicator of abnormal accruals) 
 
Independent variable 
In this study, four independent variables to be considered are as follows: 
• The percentage of shares owned by directors: 
The percentage of ownership of the board members shall receive a fixed salary from the company and their 
family members in the shares of companies that are the responsibility of the board members must often or 
managing director or managing director are closely related. 
• Institutional ownership 
Is equal to the stock in the hands of big investors such as banks, insurance companies, pension funds, investment 
companies and other public companies (Bvshy, 1998: 306). This variable Avgarlv research (2000), Didmen 
(2000), Charv et al. (2005), Lang and Saho (2008) and Alsayd (2010) is used in the same sense. 
• The percentage of outside board members: 
Outside members of the Board of Directors refers to persons whose part-time member of the Board of Directors 
and the firm does not receive a fixed salary (Ghaemi and Shahriari, 2009: 120). According to Lee (1994), Denis 
and Sarin (1999), periost (2002), Charv et al. (2005), Donnelly and Kelly (2005), Boone et al. (2007), Goust 
CACC it = (∆CA it - ∆CASH it) – (∆CL it - ∆CLD it)                                                              (1) 
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(2008), Cools et al. (2008), link et al. (2008), evasaky (2008), Chayn (2008), Lee and Harrison (2008), Atmaja et 
al (2009), Lyhn et al (2009), Chaizma and Kim (2010) and Hey and Sumer (2010) and Pathan and School 
(2010), a study of outside board members to the total number of board members is used. 
 
5 - Sample statistics 
The population of this research has been accepted by all banks in the Tehran Stock Exchange (currently 10 
banks) during 2009 to 2013 is formed. 
 
6. Methods 
Since this study is to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and management features in 
bank profits is accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange; research for the study, correlation and multiple regression to 
test the relationship between these variables is used to stepwise. 
Following regression model was used to test the hypotheses: 
 
 
ح Symbol Row 
Management Earnings (abnormal accruals) of the remaining model number (2) (the 
dependent variable) 
AAit 1 
Institutional ownership i at time t (independent variable) OCit 2 
Percent share ownership in the Company i t (independent variable) BSit 3 
Percent of the members corporate executives outside i in period t independent  CEOit 4 
 
7. Data collection method and scope of spatial and temporal 
The required data through observation and review of documents such as financial data banks collected. In this 
study, to develop research literature library method has been used to test research hypotheses financial 
statements of companies listed on the stock exchange and application of the outcomes of the new site, have been 
used. The research on the banks listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange is done and the period in question, from the 
beginning to the end of 2009 to 2013. 
 
8. Data analysis 
In this study, the Pearson correlation coefficient and multiple regression was used to analyze the data. 
Preliminary data in the Excel spreadsheet file format in software design was completed and data to statistical 
analysis, SPSS software was used. 
9. The results of the test the research hypothesis 
Table 1: The incoming variables 
As the table (1) can be seen, the results of the test variables are entered into the model using regression. This test 
can be optimized using the regression model and independent variables, which can be entered into the regression 
model, to determine. The results indicate that the independent variables were entered into the model. 
 
Table 2: Summary of regression 
The estimated standard deviation  Adjusted R2 R2 R Regression model  
0.0125 0.672 0.097 0.311 1 
Coefficient of determination as well as measure the strength of the relationship between independent variables 
and the dependent variable and describes the control. The value of this parameter indicates that the percentage of 
variability explained by the independent variables and control .As the Table 2 can be seen in this model, the 
coefficient of determination is equal to 0.097. I.e.  9.7% of the variability is explained by the independent 
variables and control. 
  
Enter regression model method The variables entering 
1 Enter Possession shareholders 
2 Enter The percentage of non-duty members of the Board of Directors 
3 Enter The percentage of institutional ownership 
AAit, = β0 + β1 OCit+ β2 BSitt + β3 CEOit +έi,t       (3) 
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9-1-test the significance of the regression model assumptions: 
Table 3: Test the significance of the regression model using ANOVA 
In a multivariable regression equation, if any relationship between independent variables and the dependent 
variable and there is no control, we control all the parameters and independent variables in the equation equal to 
zero. Therefore, the significance of the regression tested. This is done using F statistics. As shown in Table (3) 
observed, the F-statistics and the significance of this statistic indicates that statistical null hypothesis that the 
meaningless of the whole model (all zero coefficients) is rejected and regression the estimated total is significant. 
9-2-sample t-test to evaluate significant regression coefficients minor 
Using a t-test to evaluate the significance Student factors described above. If the confidence level of the absolute 
value of α is smaller than expected, there will prove to be a factor in the model. 
Table (4): Results of t-test to assess partial regression coefficients are significant 
significant   T-Test 
standardized 
coefficients Not standardized coefficients Regression model 
Beta coefficient standard deviation 
0.048 2.032  0.010 0.005 constant 
0.632 2.432 0.095 0.009 0.018 Institutional ownership 
0.183 1.352 0.242 0.014 0.011 Percent share ownership 
0.969 0.0039 0.06 0.0 0.010 Percent of the members 
outside 
 
• First hypothesis: an institution to manage the impact of interest listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange. 
As shown in Table (4) Therefore, the level of institutional ownership of the independent variables shows that 
there is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and earnings management. Also, given that the 
level of significance of the relationship between earnings management and institutional ownership of more than 
5 percent, so this is meaningless. Therefore, the first hypothesis of the study will not be accepted. 
• The second hypothesis: the percentage of shares owned by directors of listed banks in Tehran Stock 
Exchange on earnings management influence. 
As shown in Table (4) is significant, positive relationship between the percentage of share ownership and 
earnings management executives there. However, given that the significant levels of share ownership and 
earnings management executives (sig = 0.183> 0.05). So this is not significant. Therefore, the second hypothesis 
is not accepted. 
The third hypothesis: the percentage of non-Earnings management shall affect banks listed in Tehran 
Stock Exchange. 
As shown in Table (4) is considered the percentage of non-duty members of the board and there is a positive 
relationship between earnings management. Also, given that the level of significance required in the relationship 
between earnings management and the percentage of non-members (Sig = 0.969> 0.05). So, it is not significant 
in this regard. Therefore, the hypothesis that the third sub-study will not be accepted. 
 
10. Conclusion recommendations based on the results 
The results showed that all banks listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange, the three characteristics of corporate 
governance (institutional ownership percentage of share ownership required for managers and other members of 
the board) in earnings management incentives with Earnings management association do not meaningful. In 
other words, three features of corporate governance in the management of Earnings or motivation, time 
management, high profit and low-Earnings management at the time did not have the motivation. Finally, we can 
conclude that three corporate governance features examined in the present study can impact on earnings 
management in banks is accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange. Thus, according to the results of research in order 
to protect the rights of minority shareholders, increasing the reliability of profit and contribute to the 
development and growth of the stock market, be other mechanisms of corporate governance, such as the 
independence of the Board of Directors, the Board of Directors, the Audit and Audit Committee in order to 















1.647 0 3 0.0 0.001 Regression 1 
 0 46  0.007 Residuals 
  49  0.008 Total 
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